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standing in human beings.
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1. Importance of the criteria. The set of criteria proposed in the target article makes clear
that sentience has functional and emotive components. These criteria are indeed, as Crump
et al. (2022) argue, undemanding and rigorous. Satisfying them should be accepted as a
sufficient threshold for an animal to be granted sentience, and therefore, some degree of
moral and epistemic standing. Moreover, verifying sentience in decapod crustaceans is a very
important step towards developing a general framework for animal sentience. A key
contribution of the target article is the proposal to use these findings as a justification for
animal welfare. We need this kind of cross-disciplinary engagement with political and legal
decision-makers for science to achieve a more concrete connection with fundamental ethical
questions. The authors carefully clarify how behavioural and functional patterns can occur in
the absence of sentience. This is why they add motivational, integrative, and biochemical
components, which makes the case for sentience much more likely. Here, I examine the
distinct normative justifications that may underlie different criteria in animal welfare based
on the different roles of functional and emotive factors. Otherwise, a risk in applying this
framework across species is that an evidence-based approach may result in discrepancies
between the largely theoretical views on moral worth and legal standing, and the scientific
evidence: Species would not be protected under a clear and uniform legal framework, but
rather under a scattered and poorly understood set of belief systems concerning animal
cognition.
2. Cognition, worth, and legal protection. There can be cognitive function without a specific
kind of experience or valence, or alternatively, there can be subjective experience without
certain capacities for detection, representation, categorization or knowledge. A cognitive
agent may be able to recognize bodily damage with precision and make decisions based on
such recognition capacities. But it is at least conceivable that they could fail to feel pain. The
authors propose detection-based and anatomical markers for basic sentience, but also more
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sophisticated criteria based on value judgements. Criterion number 5 (Motivational tradeoffs), in particular, calls for categorization, learning, and motivational trade-offs that clearly
require specific experiences of pain. These capacities should be sufficient for sentience. But
perhaps something less sophisticated might suffice for epistemic status (the status of counting
as an agent worthy of protection on the basis of the knowledge that it possesses).
1. Nociception
2. Sensory integration
3. Integrated nociception
4. Analgesia: (a) endogenous (b) exogenous
5. Motivational trade-offs
6. Flexible self-protection
7. Associative Learning
8. Analgesia preference: (a) self-administer (b) location (c) prioritised

Eight criteria for pain sentience
(Crump et al., 2022, §2.2)

Suppose that an agent with the capacity to recognize bodily damage, but without the capacity
to feel pain, is actually better at detecting bodily damage than those who have experiences
of pain. Such an agent has valuable knowledge but lacks the capacity to relate it to
experiences of suffering, either because of a kind of congenital insensitivity to pain or because
of pain asymbolia. The difficulty for such an agent would be to judge the trade-offs concerning
when it is appropriate to undergo a certain degree of suffering to achieve valuable goals.
Criterion 5 is, therefore, more closely related to the kind of cognition required in humans to
have moral worth than to other criteria. In convincing legislators and the public at large, it
may be useful to explicitly address which criteria are more relevant for either epistemic or
moral worth. However, some legal protections can be accorded even in the absence of clearly
sufficient criteria for moral standing (granted typically on the basis of sentience). For example,
legal protections can be granted on the basis of epistemic value, considering agents as sources
of knowledge. This is the kind of protection we give to corporations and their property, or to
legal entities that are protected on the basis of their interest to legal systems, despite their
lack of sentience.
3. Empathic responsiveness and moral worth. As mentioned, there might be cases in which
sentience is present, but some kinds of decision-making and learning that are relevant for full
moral status are absent: suffering, but no cognitive integration with memory and decisionmaking. One of the most comprehensive and integrative accounts of consciousness offered
in the literature, grounded in cognitive functions, is defended by Ginsburg and Jablonka
(2019). In their current commentary on the paper by Crump et al., Ginsburg and Jablonka
(2022) indicate that although some of Crump et al.’s criteria may be redundant, there is
enough overlap between the two accounts to achieve agreement. This kind of evidence-based
consensus is extremely important for bridging the gap between scientific findings and
legislative protection. However, precise distinctions concerning the nature of cognitive
capacities, some more relevant for moral worth than others, are also crucial to fully bridging
this gap. Different regimes of animal protection are possible and should be discussed on
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different grounds. The dichotomy between full legal protection akin to personhood, granted
on the basis of human moral worth, and no protection whatsoever, has been exceedingly
harmful and unproductive. More nuance is needed in this debate, particularly concerning its
potential legal consequences. Furthermore, sentience may come in a variety of forms, which
may play different roles, just the way different types of attention satisfy diverse cognitive
needs (Montemayor, 2021). It is also plausible that minimal forms of sentience are already
sufficient for meriting some kinds of protection that require political and legal reforms. A
thorough framework for animal sentience in relation to its legal protection, however, requires
examining all kinds of morally and epistemically relevant sentience.
4. Conclusion. The most sophisticated forms of sentience and consciousness may only be
relevant for the most robust kinds of moral and epistemic worth. An understanding of various
forms of sentience according to different criteria is important in order to bridge the gap
between scientific research and political action. We protect corporations as legal persons for
epistemic, rather than moral reasons. Jurisprudence and the social sciences should be taken
into account in this debate, as Gorman (2022) recommends. This effort should include a
discussion of various legal protections based on the epistemic and moral capacities of
animals. Justifications for legal protection require a degree of precision that a wide variety of
views regarding consciousness cannot provide. There is considerable confusion in the media
and even among specialists regarding this important issue, as illustrated by the recent case of
the Google engineer who sought legal protection for LAMDA, a large language processor (see
Levin, 2022). The conversation needs to change. Sentient life on our planet is clearly more
relevant ethically than corporate products. Concrete criteria are needed to justify this
conclusion. However, if we are already contemplating rights to corporate products, we should
first be more than willing to extend them to a large variety of animals.
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